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By AMANI ELNASRI, KEVIN J. FOX* 
Research and innovation are widely agreed to be major driving forces 
behind long-term productivity and economic growth. However, the 
relationships have proven to be difficult to quantify. We make reference 
to the international literature and draw on recent research for 
Australia to advance our understanding of these relationships. 
Particular focus is on assessing the impact of publically financed 
R&D on productivity. The conclusions have implications for 
government innovation policies, providing insight into possible 
productivity gains from funding reallocations. Specifically, the findings 
suggest that government research agencies and higher education are 
areas in which investment leads to more potential productivity gains. 
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he role of government funding in supporting R&D and innovation has been a 
topic of persistent interest in both academic and policy circles. Much of this 
interest derives from the perceived, yet often unreliably quantified, relationship 
between R&D, innovation and productivity growth, which in turn is a significant 
contributor to long-term economic growth and well-being. 
Productivity growth, as per the standard statistical agency definition, is the ratio 
of output growth to input growth, that is, the amount of growth in output that 
cannot be explained by the growth in measured inputs. Labour productivity is 
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based solely on labour inputs (e.g., hours worked to produce the outputs), whereas 
multifactor productivity (MFP) takes into account the multiple inputs used in 
production (e.g., labour, capital and land).1  
The contribution to economic growth through resources utilisation is limited by 
the finite nature of resources; hence, sustained economic growth in the long term 
has to come from productivity enhancements. Many possible sources of 
productivity growth have been proposed and examined extensively in the literature; 
see, e.g., Rosenberg (1963, 1981), Schmookler (1966), Griliches (1998), Diewert 
(2001), Isaksson (2007), Wong et al. (2007), Hall and Rosenberg (2010), Soames  
et al. (2011) and Syverson (2011). The literature regards investments in research 
and innovation (such as information and communication technology (ICT), R&D, 
skills development, design and organisational improvements and other types of 
intangible assets) as central drivers of productivity; they create more efficient 
services and production processes, more effective workplace organisation and open 
up new markets (Hall 2011, Aghion et al. 2009, Gorodnichenko et al. 2010, Yaşar 
and Morrison Paul 2012). 
Over the last few decades, productivity growth has played a key part in the 
growth of the Australian economy, with a particularly notable and well-
documented role during the mid-1990s. This is generally attributed to 
microeconomic reform and the uptake of information and communications 
technology (ICT). However, there has been recent concern in Australia and other 
developed economies about the apparent slowdown in innovation and productivity 
growth; see, e.g., Parham (2012) and Connolly and Gustafsson (2013) for Australia, 
and Gordon (2012) and Phelps (2013) for the U.S. To illustrate the source of this 
concern, Figure 1 plots labour productivity for OECD countries, along with the 
OECD average, over the periods 1995-2004 and 2005-2012.2 
 
 
FIGURE 1. LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH, REAL GDP PER HOUR WORKED, ANNUAL AVERAGE 
1 MFP is sometime called total factor productivity (TFP). Many statistical agencies prefer the MFP 
terminology, as “total” factor productivity could be inaccurately interpreted as implying that all factors (i.e. inputs) 
related to production have been accounted for in the analysis.  
2From a speech by Dr. Phillip Lowe, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of Australia: “Demographics, 
Productivity and Innovation,” the Sydney Institute, Sydney, 12 March 2014. http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/ 
2014/sp-dg-120314.html 
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Real gross domestic product (GDP) as a ratio to hours worked is a rough but 
standard measure of labour productivity growth.3 As labour productivity is a key 
determinant of wages, this pattern of generally lower productivity in the more 
recent period raises the question of whether or not this is driven simply by 
macroeconomic conditions, or if there are microeconomic policy responses which 
may encourage innovation and entrepreneurial effort to again achieve the 
productivity performance of the past.4 
This paper reviews the productivity performance of Australia, and examines the 
role that public support may have in fostering higher future productivity growth 
through funding support for R&D and innovation. 
 
I. Productivity Performance: The Australian Experience 
 
For a better understanding of the productivity performance of Australia, it is 
useful to refer to the detailed Estimates of Industry Multifactor Productivity 
produced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). These take into account 
additional inputs, in particular, capital and land, and adjust labour for 
compositional changes; see ABS (2007, 2013). These accounts report annual 
results for sixteen “market” (i.e. non-government) sectors of the economy. Here, 
the focus will be on the original twelve industries (ABS 2007) for which the 
longest time series is available.  
 
 
FIGURE 2. LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH SLOWDOWN 
 
Notes: Annual average growth between 1994–95 to 2003–04 and 2004–05 to 2011–13. Derived from ABS Cat. 
No. 5260.0.55.002 - Estimates of Industry Multifactor Productivity, 2012-13, Table 6. Labour productivity indexes,  
Gross value added per hour worked. 
3Note that by using hours worked as the labour measure, there is no adjustment for variations in work intensity 
or changes in the composition of the labour force due to education and training; such adjustments to labour input 
may be of interest for an analysis of productivity, but they require additional assumptions and more data, posing 
problems for the internationally comparability of results. 
4While Gordon (2012) and Phelps (2013) have been pessimistic in their assessment of the future of innovation 
and productivity, it is worth noting the following from Griliches (1988), commenting on an earlier productivity 
slowdown: “But what about the evidence of a decline in “inventiveness” ....?” “I interpret most of the proffered 
evidence as reflecting the impact of reduced aggregate demand and less favourable economic prospects for 
inventive activity in the late 1970s, rather than as the result of technological springs running dry.” 
-10 -5 0 5 10 15
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Mining
Manufacturing
Electricity, Gas, Water and Waste Services
Construction
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Accommodation and Food Services
Transport, Postal and Warehousing
Information, Media and Telecommunications
Financial and Insurance Services
Arts and Recreation Services
Market Sector (12)
% 
1994-95 to 2003-04
2004-05 to 2012-13
                                           
76 KDI Journal of Economic Policy FEBRUARY 2015 
First, using the labour productivity series from these accounts, it is possible to 
see the productivity decline by sector by comparing the average productivity 
growth from 1994-95 to 2003-04 to that from 2004-05 to 2012-13, as plotted in 
Figure 2. 
It is clear that there was a significant slowdown in productivity growth for all 
sectors except for the construction sector.  
From the multifactor productivity statistics from the ABS accounts for these 
industries over the period of 2003-04 to 2012-13, the level of market-sector 
multifactor productivity declined by around 5 percent. Given the importance of 
both labour and multifactor productivity in determining living standards in the long 
run, such periods of declining productivity are of significant public policy concern. 
To provide further insight, Figure 3 plots the multifactor productivity 
performance for each of the twelve core market-sector industries, as well as for the 
aggregate of the twelve market sectors, “market-sector” (12), over the period of 
1989-90 to 2012-13. Although market-sector productivity grew by 16 percent over 
this period, there have been significantly different experiences over time and across 
industries; mining is 35 percent less productive in 2012-13 than in 1989-90, while 
agriculture, forestry and fishing were 72 percent more productive, with most of the 
productivity gains coming before 2004-05.  
 
 
FIGURE 3. MARKET-SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY INDEXES 
 
Source: ABS Cat. No. 5260.0.55.002 - Estimates of Industry Multifactor Productivity, 2012-13, Table 1. 
Gross value added based multifactor productivity indexes, quality-adjusted hours worked basis. 
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Much of this dispersion in productivity performance can be explained. For 
example, the mining industry has made long-term investments in infrastructure, 
which take years to complete, and more time must elapse before they result in 
higher levels of output. The electricity, gas, water and waste services industry also 
experienced a significant decline in productivity over the period (28 percent). This 
can be partially explained by the electricity sector making catch-up investments in 
infrastructure following privatisation, without corresponding increases in outputs; 
some commentators have suggested that this was “gold plating” on the part of the 
networks. Such investments do not immediately result in increased production and 
therefore have a downward impact on annual productivity figures. As might be 
expected from these examples, labour productivity growth (on an hours-worked 
basis) generally paints a more positive picture, with 76 percent growth over the 
same period for the market sector (12), although labour productivity in mining has 
fallen by almost 100 percent since the peak in 2001-02, reflecting the large increase 
in employment in this sector without, however, a corresponding increase in output. 
Other factors may have also contributed to the mixed productivity performance 
over time and over sectors. Reducing trade barriers, increasing competition and 
privatising large public-sector organisations may have had productivity impacts on 
some sectors more than others. In addition, improvements in public infrastructure, 
changes in public support for R&D, unmeasured quality changes in outputs, 
workplace relations, new regulation and legislation, and a possible slide in 
Australia’s take-up of productivity-enhancing technologies all may have had 
differential effects on sectors. See Connolly and Gustafsson (2013)5 and Parham 
(2012),6 two recent studies that assessed some possible explanations of the recent 
productivity performance. 
With such potentially diverse contributing factors, there are obvious 
complexities in disentangling the influences on productivity at this level, which in 
turn impedes an analysis of the fundamental drivers of productivity. A better 
understanding of the transmission of public policy and innovation through to 
measured productivity growth is thus important for informing effective innovation 
policy. 
 
II. Innovation and Productivity 
 
While there are many possible influences on productivity, innovation is 
recognised as being key to increasing productivity in the economy. Productivity has 
been shown to be positively correlated with innovation performance.7 The OECD 
5“The current labour-intensive mining investment phase is beginning to wind down and is expected to be 
followed over the period ahead by a substantial pick-up in mining output, which should boost measured 
productivity in the mining industry and the economy more generally.” “Looking ahead, there is reason to believe 
that productivity growth will return to being the main driver of improved living standards.” Connolly and 
Gustafsson (2013). 
6Parham (2012) considers volatility and cyclical effects, compositional shifts, adjustment pressures, and 
measurement error as sources of the productivity slump. He concludes as follows: “The key point is that, to the 
extent that such explanations are at work, a drop in measured productivity growth does not represent a prosperity-
sapping misallocation of resources or loss of knowledge or efficiency.” 
7See, for example, Hall (2011), Crepon et al. (1998), Janz et al. (2003), Mairesse and Robin (2010), 
Siedschlag, Zhang and Cahill (2010), Criscuolo and Haskel (2003) and Loof and Heshmati (2006). 
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(2005) defines innovation as follows: 
The implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or 
service), or process, a new marketing method or a new organisational method 
in business practices, workplace organisation or external relations. 
It is important to understand that R&D is just one input to innovation. Not all 
science, research and technology contribute to productivity growth, and not all 
innovations arise from R&D. Innovations contribute to productivity growth either 
by lowering the cost of production or by improving the quality of goods and 
services. Some innovations, such as those that lead to improvements in quality of 
goods and services, may make only a small contribution to improving measured 
productivity. However, some of these lead to improved well-being and quality of 
life, such as technological improvements in aged care. Increasing the stock of 
knowledge may, at times, make large and unexpected contributions to productivity. 
Sometimes productivity gains are captured by innovating firms, but often the 
benefits of innovation also flow to firms copying the ideas or using new products 
that have been developed by others. Put another way, the rationale for 
governmental intervention in the area of research and innovation is the existence of 
market failure associated with research and innovation. This type of market failure 
is typically due to the diffusion of knowledge beyond the control of the inventor, 
which implies that the private rate of return to research and innovation is lower 
than its social return. Additionally, the high risks involved in innovation discourage 
firms from engaging in such activities. For both reasons, the amount invested by 
firms in research activities in a competitive framework is likely to be below the 
socially optimal level. Thus, there is a potential role for governments to intervene 
to eliminate this gap between private and social returns. 
Information and communications technology (ICT) has been shown to be a 
major factor in productivity gains experienced towards the end of the 20th century; 
see, e.g., Oliner, Sichel and Stiroh (2007) and Connolly and Fox (2006). These 
gains have been described as spectacular in ICT-producing industries and more 
modest in ICT-using industries (Syverson 2011). Like most countries, Australia has 
only a small ICT-producing industry, and most of the productivity gains from ICT 
are via the use of ICT. For example, Australia’s banking sector now operates with 
fewer tellers and relies extensively on Internet transactions.  
 
III. Knowledge and Other Intangibles 
 
In general, economic growth can be decomposed into two components: the 
growth of factor inputs (such as capital, labour and land) and the growth of 
productivity. Productivity is a measure of how efficiently an economy utilises finite 
resources to produce goods and services. There are several ways to improve 
productivity, but knowledge capital (through new technology, skills, R&D and 
efficient services and production processes) is a significant factor. New technology 
enables the same level of output to be produced with fewer inputs.  
The effect of knowledge capital on productivity may work through various 
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channels depending on the source of the knowledge. For example, R&D, a major 
component of knowledge capital, can be performed either by the business sector, 
the public sector or beyond the borders of a country. Each of these types of R&D 
performers can be a source of significant domestic technological change. R&D 
performed by the business sector results in new goods and services, a higher 
quality of output, and new production processes. These are sources of productivity 
growth at the firm and national levels.  
Many empirical studies confirm the positive impact of business R&D on 
productivity; see, e.g., Griliches (1998), and Nadiri (1993). Business-performed 
R&D may be funded by business itself or by the government. Accordingly, 
business R&D may have a different effect on productivity, depending on its source 
of funding (which affects the research agenda and the incentive structure). For 
example, Lichtenberg (1993) tests whether government-funded R&D performed by 
firms had a different impact than business-funded R&D. The author’s evidence 
suggests that while privately funded R&D investment has a significant positive 
effect on productivity, government support for business R&D has a negative impact. 
Besides their support for business R&D, governments are major R&D 
performers through their funding of government research agencies and higher 
education R&D. Research agencies and university R&D have been shown to have 
a strong effect on scientific and basic knowledge and on public missions. Basic 
research performed by universities enhances the stock of knowledge available to 
society (Mowery and Sampat, 2010). It may open new opportunities for business 
research, which in turn may improve productivity. Nevertheless, there have been 
few attempts to measure the impact of public R&D on productivity. In a group of 
studies, only some components of public research have been used in empirical 
frameworks. For example, Adams (1990) examines the contribution of fundamental 
stocks of knowledge, proxied by accumulated academic scientific papers, and finds 
significant contributions to productivity growth in manufacturing industries in the 
U.S. Another example is Poole and Bernard (1992), who examine military 
innovations and find a negative impact on total factor productivity in Canada. 
The knowledge originating from abroad is a third source of new technology for 
any national economy. Evidence demonstrates many avenues through which 
knowledge can cross the borders of a given country and, depending on the absorptive 
capacity, how it can improve productivity in other countries (Mohnen 2001).  
The Australian literature has a limited number of studies that have quantitatively 
examined Australia’s innovation system and its impact. Most of these studies 
focused on the link between productivity and R&D, ignoring other types of 
innovation, such as management and organisational arrangements. The R&D 
measures employed by these studies largely relate to business R&D (e.g., Shanks 
and Zheng 2006 and Louca 2003). Moreover, the empirical evidence obtained by 
these studies was mixed or generally not supportive of the productive role of 
business R&D. For example, Shanks and Zheng (2006) find that despite the 
advances in data collection and methods used, they were unable to find a 
consistently robust result with regard to the impact of R&D on productivity: 
“At this point in time, there remains no precise, robust estimate of the effect of 
increases in domestic business R&D on Australia’s productivity performance. 
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Standard models and estimation methods, grounded in theory, tended to 
generate unreliable results, as well as estimates that were sensitive to 
seemingly modest changes in specification. A comprehensive investigation of 
alternative specifications and estimation techniques brought new insights, but 
proved unable to arrive at any definitive estimate.” (Shanks and Zheng 2006,  
p. XLI)8 
There are a small number of cases in which the role of higher education R&D is 
assessed. One example is a study by Burgio-Ficca (2004), who finds evidence of a 
positive relationship between higher education R&D and gross state product. With 
the exception of the Productivity Commission study (2007), there is no study 
which has explicitly scrutinised the effects of publicly funded R&D for Australia.9 
Although the results suggest significant aggregate economic, social and 
environmental benefits from publicly supported science and innovation, the 
Productivity Commission (2007) study finds that the quantitative estimates are 
statistically unreliable. 
Despite its importance, R&D is not the only source of new technology. 
Innovation can result from the contributions made by other types of intangible 
capital, and extends beyond physical capital accumulation. We now consider this 
broader class of intangibles. 
Despite the increase in their prominence, in many countries research and 
innovation, among a large set of intangible assets, are largely ignored in National 
Accounts and corporate financial reports because they are difficult to understand 
and measure. Two recent studies by Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005, 2006), 
henceforth collectively referred to as CHS, have drawn attention to the importance 
of measuring and capitalising intangibles. Using U.S. data, CHS developed a 
methodology with which to capitalise a broad range of intangibles and, by applying 
a growth accounting framework, demonstrated how the conventional growth rates 
of inputs, output and productivity measures changed as a consequence; see Table 1 
for the CHS classification of intangibles assets, and the corresponding summary 
statistics for estimates for Australia from Elnasri and Fox (2014). Following CHS, 
researchers in a number of other advanced countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, 
Japan, Netherlands, Canada and Australia) have conducted similar studies, finding 
results similar to those of CHS.10 
Following the recommendations of the System of National Accounts (SNA) 
1993, Australia was one of the first countries to capitalise computer software, 
artistic originals and mineral exploration in 1993, rather than treating them as 
intermediate inputs. In addition, as part of the revisions to implement the 
recommendations contained in SNA 2008, Australia started to capitalise scientific 
R&D from 2009. However, as shown in Table 1, intangible assets are not restricted 
8For a concise summary and discussion of this and related work, see Parham (2006). 
9A small number of studies have partially addressed this question with data on the gross expenditures on  
R&D: Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD), an aggregate measure of business, government and higher education 
R&D. However, using GERD as a measure will not isolate the effects of government or higher education R&D. 
Thompson (2009) uses firm-level data to examine the effectiveness of the R&D tax concessions as an effective 
policy tool, but does not consider other types of support for R&D. 
10While this approach is becoming widely accepted, there are alternatives to the CHS approach to capitalising 
intangibles; see, e.g., Griliches (1981), Webster and Jensen (2006) and Diewert and Huang (2011). 
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TABLE 1—ESTIMATES OF NOMINAL INTANGIBLE INVESTMENTS IN THE AUSTRALIAN MARKET SECTOR 
Categories    1974-1975 
1984-
1985 
1994-
1995 
2004-
2005 
 2012- 
 2013 
 millions of dollars 
Computerised information 26 627 3,512 7,262 9,948 
      
Innovative property 917 3,857 9,342 19,414 38,624 
Scientific R&D; Social sciences R&D (Business R&D) 199 614 2,782 7,010 14,483 
Mineral exploration 203 1,271 1,567 2,074 7,849 
Copyright and licence costs (Artistic originals) 35 172 256 1045 2,450 
Other product development, design and research 480 1,800 4,737 9,286 13,841 
New product development in financial industry 342 1,310 3,133 5,311 8,338 
New architectural and engineering designs 137 490 1,604 3,975 5,504 
      
Economic competencies 1,259 4,926 11,276 23,374 33,428 
Brand equity 653 2,830 4,679 8,365 10,362 
Advertising 648 2,774 4,420 7,391 9,463 
Market research 5 56 260 974 899 
Firm-specific human capital 301 1,024 2,669 3,870 5,791 
Organisational capital 306 1,073 3,927 11,138 17,276 
Purchased 21 232 1,944 7,058 9,143 
Own account 284 840 1,983 4,081 8,133 
      
Total intangibles investment 2,202 9,410 24,130 50,050 82,000 
New intangibles 1,739 6,726 16,013 32,659 47,270 
National Accounts intangibles 463 2,684 8,118 17,391 34,730 
Tangibles 9,251 32,333 54,984 10,6195 227,751 
Total investment 11,453 41,743 79,114 156,245 309,751 
      
Share of computerised information % 1 7 15 15 12 
Share of innovative property % 42 41 39 39 47 
Share of economic competencies % 57 52 47 47 41 
      
Share of intangible investment% 19 23 31 32 26 
Share of tangible investment% 81 77 69 68 74 
      
Ratio intangible to tangible investment 0.24 0.29 0.44 0.47 0.36 
Notes: The share of tangible (intangible) investment is the ratio of tangibles (intangibles) to total investment. The 
shares of computerised information, innovative property, and economic competencies are calculated relative to all 
intangibles. 
 
 
to these four elements, with firms also investing in other types of intangible assets 
which may represent a source of economic growth; these investments are still 
treated in the National Accounts as current expenses. Excluding investment in 
intangibles underestimates total investment, which in turn may misrepresent the 
measures of output, capital services, factor income shares and consequently 
productivity. 
For Australia, Elnasri and Fox (2014) extend the work of Barnes and McClure 
(2009) and de Rassenfosse (2012) in applying the methodology of CHS to measure 
and classify a range of ‘new’ intangibles. However, as they state, “Given the 
experimental nature of the methodology, the assumptions required, measurement 
challenges and data limitations, the estimates should be interpreted as only 
indicative” (Barnes and McClure 2009, p. XIII).11 
From Table 1, we see that investment in intangibles has increased over time, 
11The following results are drawn from Elnasri and Fox (2014). 
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FIGURE 4. MARKET-SECTOR REAL TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE INVESTMENTS (1974-75 TO 2012-13) 
 
 
FIGURE 5. SHARES OF NOMINAL TOTAL INTANGIBLE INVESTMENT, BY ASSET TYPE PERCENT 
 
reaching $82 billion in 2012-13 and constituting around 26 percent of all 
investment in the market sector for that year. With the exception of the last few 
years, total investment in intangibles grew more rapidly than investment in 
tangibles, as shown in Figure 4. The ratio of intangibles to tangibles increased 
continuously from 0.24 in 1974-75 to 0.47 in 2004-05; however, it decreased to 
0.36 by 2012-13. Only computer software, artistic originals, mineral exploration 
and R&D have been capitalised in the Australian System of National Accounts, and 
these constitute less than half of the total amount of intangible investment. In 2012-
13, National Accounts intangibles accounted for 42 percent of the total amount of 
intangible investment, while new intangibles accounted for 58 percent. 
Table 1 and Figure 5 show that the composition of intangible investments has 
changed considerably over the last three and a half decades. For the first four years 
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presented in Table 1, the component of economic competencies is the largest 
component of intangible investment, with an average share of 51 percent. The 
second largest component was innovative property, with an average share of 40 
percent. However, by 2012-13, these two categories of intangibles had reversed 
their contribution ranking; economic competencies decreased to 41 percent while 
the share of innovative property increased to 47 percent. Investment in 
computerised information has dramatically increased over time, although 
remaining the smallest component of intangibles. Figure 5 illustrates the extent of 
the shift towards investment in computerised information and organisational capital 
over time. The share of organisational capital has increased, while that of economic 
competencies as a group has decreased, influenced by the decrease in brand equity 
and firm-specific human capital. The share of innovative property decreased 
slightly but started to recover by the end of the period, as the involvement of firms 
in business R&D has increased noticeably in recent years.  
Elnasri and Fox (2014) use the CHS methodology to capitalise the new, broader 
class of intangibles, and compare the impact on multifactor productivity (MFP) 
growth for the market sector from different treatments of intangibles investment. 
Figure 6 shows that capitalising expenditures on intangibles changes the rate of 
MFP growth. In particular, the figure indicates that MFP growth decreases as more 
knowledge, innovation and other intangible assets are accounted for. This can be 
explained by the fact that the inclusion of intangibles has raised output growth by a 
lower rate than it has raised the growth in inputs. Although the rate of MFP growth 
has decreased across the period, the pattern of the growth remains unchanged. 
Specifically, the improvement in productivity during the productivity growth cycle 
of 1998-99 to 2003-04 and the overall decline during the recent productivity 
growth cycle is still present after capitalising intangibles. Hence, enhanced 
measurement by capitalising intangibles in this way does not resolve the recent 
productivity decline. 
 
 
FIGURE 6. MULTIFACTOR PRODUCTIVITY, MARKET SECTOR, 1974-75 TO 2012-13 
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IV. Public Funding 
 
Besides fulfilling public needs (such as improving the products and services 
offered or better delivery of functions), the economic rationale for governmental 
involvement in the area of research and innovation is the existence of market 
failure associated with research and innovation. This type of market failure is 
typically due to the diffusion of knowledge beyond the control of the innovator, 
which implies that the private rate of return to research and innovation is lower 
than its social return. Thus, governments intervene to eliminate this gap between 
private and social returns. 
Another reason for the provision of public support is that governments want to 
stimulate research and innovation performed by the business sector. This is likely 
to be below the socially optimal level, as firms are often discouraged from 
engaging in research activities by the inherently high risk of research (Arrow 1962). 
Therefore, governments intervene to assist firms either by mitigating their private 
costs or by raising awareness of the technological opportunities that are available to 
reduce both the cost and uncertainty of research and innovation. 
There are two main sources of data on public support for R&D and innovation in 
Australia: the Science, Research and Innovation Budget Tables (SRIBTs) and the 
ABS survey on R&D. With each federal budget, the Australian government 
publishes SRIBTs, which provide an overview of government support for science, 
research and innovation over a period of ten years. The SRIBTs summarise the 
total amount of Australian government support by sector of performance while also 
breaking down total expenditures by program and socioeconomic objectives. The 
ABS survey on public spending on R&D captures R&D expenditures when the 
R&D is performed. 
The SRIBTs classify government support for research and innovation into four 
sectors of performance: Commonwealth research agencies, the higher education 
sector, the business enterprise sector, and a “multisector” category. Figure 7 
presents public spending as estimated for the year 2012-13. The higher education 
sector is the recipient of the largest share of science and innovation funding from 
the Australian government, receiving around 32 percent of all public support, 
followed by the business enterprise sector and those in the multisector category, 
which respectively received 25 percent and 23 percent of all support. The research 
agency sector has received the smallest portion of support, equivalent to 20 percent 
of the total support. 
The public funding devoted to each of these sectors is allocated to different areas. 
An analysis of the $8.9 billion outlay by the Australian government for R&D and 
innovation in 2012-13 shows the following: 
 
Higher Education Research: Performance-based block funding (PBBF) accounts 
for 67 percent of the total funding to the higher education sector. PBBF is provided 
through a number of ‘performance-based’ arrangements, such as the Research 
Training Scheme (RTS), the Institutional Grants Scheme (IGS), the Research 
Infrastructure Block Grants scheme (RIBG), and the Australian Postgraduate  
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FIGURE 7. AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON SCIENCE AND INNOVATION, 2012-13 
 
Awards scheme (APA).13 Australian Research Council (ARC) funding accounts for 
31 percent of all funding to higher education. Other R&D support accounts for 2 
percent. 
 
Business Enterprise Sector: Government support for business sector science and 
innovation activities is delivered through a range of programs. The main program is 
the R&D Tax Concession, which accounts for approximately 81 percent of the total 
amount of business support in 2012-13. The categories of Other Innovation 
Support and Other R&D Support account for 18 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
Research Agencies: Two main organisations – the Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation (DSTO) – dominate the research funding allocated to 
public-sector research agencies. In 2012-13, the CSIRO accounted for 41 percent 
13These arrangements are known as “performance-based” because allocations to each institution depend on its 
past performance as assessed by various formulae administered through the Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations. 
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of all public-sector research agency funding, while the DSTO accounted for 25 
percent. Other public R&D agencies accounted for 34 percent.14  
 
Multisector: Nearly 46 percent of multisector funding is devoted to the National 
Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) and to other health grants, which 
predominantly go to universities and private non-profit medical research institutes 
(MRIs). The Cooperative Research Centres (CRCs) and Rural Funds also have 
strong university components; they constitute around 8 percent and 12 percent of 
multisector outlays, respectively. The category entitled Energy and the 
Environment has a share of 13 percent, and Other Science Support is at 21 percent. 
 
 
FIGURE 8. AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH AND INNOVATION,  
1993-94 TO 2012-13 
 
14Other public R&D agencies include the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), 
Geoscience Australia, Antarctic Division, Australian Institute of Marine Science (AIMS), Bureau of Meteorology 
Research Centre, Environmental Research Institute of the Supervising Scientist, Australian Animal Health 
Laboratory, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, and the Anglo-Australian Telescope. 
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Figure 8 plots the support for research and innovation and its components over 
time. From the top panel of the figure, total support has increased in real terms over 
the past two decades. However, as shown in the lower panel, it has fallen as a share 
of GDP. There have been noticeable changes in the role of the government support 
across its four components of funding. In particular, indirect public support for the 
business enterprise sector and for the multisector category has also grown in real 
terms during the past two decades. However, support to higher education and direct 
support to research agencies has barely grown. This has meant that the share of 
public support to the multisector category has roughly doubled between 1993-94 
and 2012-13, while support to higher education has halved. A number of factors 
can account for this changing pattern in government investment, including an 
increased focus on collaboration in the multisector category and progressive 
increases in claims on the R&D tax concessions in the business enterprise sector. 
ABS survey data can be used to explore how public R&D resources are allocated 
according to the intended purpose or outcome of the research. Figure 9 presents a 
comparison between 1992-93 and 2011-12, breaking down expenditures on R&D 
by the associated socioeconomic objective. As shown in the figure, the largest 
share of government R&D expenditure was directed towards economic activities, 
followed by defence and environment activities. However, social activities such as 
education and training and social development and community activities receive a 
small share of government R&D expenditure. 
 
 
FIGURE 9. BREAKDOWN OF UNDERPINNING RESEARCH FUNDED BY THE COMMONWEALTH AND  
  STATE/TERRITORY BY SOCIOECONOMIC OBJECTIVE, 1992-93 AND 2011-12 
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FIGURE 10. COMMONWEALTH SUPPORT FOR R&D, BY TYPE OF ACTIVITY, 1992-93 AND 2008-09 
 
The ABS data also breaks down Commonwealth expenditures on R&D 
according to the types of activities, with the categories being basic research, 
applied research and experimental development. Basic research is broken down 
further into the two types of pure and strategic basic research. Applied research is a 
critical input to the innovation system and is often seen to be more immediately 
relevant and applicable for end users, specifically industry, than basic research. In 
Figure 10 it is shown that the Commonwealth and State governments focus more 
on applied research and strategic basic research at the expense of pure basic and 
experimental development research. 
 
V. Public R&D Capital and Productivity Growth 
 
Most of the literature that examined the relationship between R&D and 
economic or productivity growth have avoided the problem of obtaining an 
estimate of R&D capital stock by employing a measure of R&D intensity (i.e., a 
ratio of R&D expenditures to the value of production); see, e.g., Griliches (1998) 
and Haskel and Wallis (2013). However, this method implicitly assumes that the 
depreciation rate of R&D is zero, which is not a very realistic assumption. Hence, 
Elnasri and Fox (2014) use the stock of public-sector R&D as estimated with the 
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method of Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005, 2006).  
Figure 10 plots multifactor productivity (MFP) growth, smoothed by a three-
year centred moving average, against the Elnasri-Fox capital stock growth of 
public support for research agencies, higher education, and business enterprise. 
Productivity and public support for higher education activities move together 
throughout the period, which gives the appearance of a strong relationship. 
Similarly, with the exception of the early years, there is co-movement between 
productivity and research agencies’ activities, again suggesting a positive 
correlation between them. Conversely, the divergent trends in productivity and the 
public support for the business enterprise sector suggest a negative relationship. 
However, this casual analysis presupposes a contemporaneous relationship between 
R&D and productivity; it is more likely that there are lagged effects of R&D 
expenditure on productivity given that knowledge typically takes time to 
disseminate. The correlations suggested by the bivariate plots may therefore 
represent an overly simplistic analysis. There may also be other potential 
influences on productivity which could be obscuring actual causal relationships. 
Therefore, to provide stronger evidence of the relationship between productivity 
and public knowledge, a detailed econometric analysis accounting for other 
influences is required. 
Elnasri and Fox (2014) provide such a detailed analysis, isolating social returns 
from private returns while controlling for various factors that can affect Australia’s 
productivity performance, such as the provision of public infrastructure, the 
business cycle, trade openness and the terms of trade. Although restricted by data 
availability to examine an aggregate of the twelve core market sectors over the 
period of 1993-94 to 2012-2013, they present extensive results from alternative 
models and conduct numerous robustness checks.15 Essentially, the results confirm 
the relationships apparent in Figure 9.  
The conclusions from the Elnasri-Fox analysis can be summarized as follows. 
There is evidence that private-sector knowledge capital is a source of positive 
spillover to market-sector productivity. That is, not all benefits of research, 
innovation and other intangibles are captured privately, but there are “social” 
benefits which diffuse throughout the market sector.  
There is strong evidence of productivity benefits from public spending on 
Commonwealth research agencies and higher education. However, the results show 
no evidence of social returns (in excess of private returns) from public support to 
the business enterprise sector, the multisector category, or defence R&D.  
Several reasons can be postulated for this. Health research funding constitutes 
nearly 50 percent of public expenditures in the multisector category in 2012-13, as 
shown in Figure 7. Its output is not part of market-sector value added, and any 
productivity effects are likely to be very long term, through improvements in the 
health of the workforce and population more generally; hence, there is a bias 
against finding a positive significant result. Similarly, it is expected that while 
some select components of expenditures on defence may result in innovations with 
15A longer time series would provide more confidence in the results, but given the lack of historical data this 
can only be remedied by the passage of time. The sample size is similar to that used in the related study of Haskel 
and Wallis (2013) for the U.K. 
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commercial value that appear in the market sector, defence services will not, again 
biasing the results against finding a positive relationship. The main public support 
for the research and innovation in the business enterprise sector is the industry 
R&D Tax Concession,16 comprising 81 percent of support to the sector in 2012-13. 
Unlike much of the funding to higher education and research agencies, the 
allocation of support is based on expenditures rather than on performance. 
Obviously, there are strong financial incentives for firms to maximise expenditures 
classified as being related to R&D, potentially biasing the results.17 In addition, 
there may be other policy goals of the R&D Tax Concession than raising 
productivity. Indeed, providing incentives for the establishment of small innovative 
firms may actually lower productivity, as new entrants often initially have lower 
productivity compared to incumbents; see, e.g., Baldwin (1995) and Aw, Chen and 
Roberts (2001).18 
On the other hand, universities and research agencies are primary sources of 
knowledge and technology creation and diffusion. While the above analysis has 
focussed on the aggregate market sector, there is substantial international evidence 
of the positive impacts of universities and research agencies on firm productivity, 
through the development of skilled labour and positive externalities (Malecki 1997; 
Medda et al. 2005). Adams (2002) found evidence of academic spillover from U.S. 
R&D laboratories that induce the clustering of firms with universities and research 
agencies, while Anselin et al. (1997) and Woodward et al. (2006) found that R&D-
intense production tends to be located close to universities. After controlling for 
corporate R&D, Jaffe (1989) found that patented inventions at the state level in the 
U.S. depend significantly on university research.  
Such evidence is not restricted to the U.S. For example, Yaşar and Morrison Paul 
(2012) found more patent activity in Chinese firms with university and research 
institution connections. In addition, they found that linkages with research 
institutions in particular raised firm productivity. The introduction of new products, 
processes, and new businesses was also positively associated with linkages with 
research institutions. 
Hence, if the policy goal is to raise private-sector productivity, the evidence 
suggests that government research agencies and higher education are the areas with 
more potential gains from public funding support.  
 
16Following a change in eligibility rules and allowances, the R&D tax concession was replaced by the “R&D 
tax incentive” from 1 July 2011: http://www.ato.gov.au/Business/Research-and-development-tax-incentive/. 
17Thompson (2009, p. 3) notes the following: “However, some have argued that anecdotal evidence does not 
support the efficacy of R&D tax incentives. Regarding the US experience, a senior correspondent from Business 
Week describes his experience, speaking, off the record, with corporate executives (Gleckman 2006): ‘In 20 years, 
I’ve never had a single corporate executive from the pharmaceutical industry or the high-tech industry, or anyplace 
else tell me that they have done a dime’s worth of research that they otherwise wouldn’t have done as a result of 
the R&D credit. They spend lots of time and effort reallocating costs so they can take advantage of the credit, but 
they don’t actually do any more research.’ For Australia, survey evaluations of the Australian R&D tax concession 
(DITR 2005; DITR 2007a) found that approximately 30% of respondents admit that their R&D efforts would not 
have been smaller or completed at a slower rate in the absence of the concession. 
18The evidence of the effectiveness of R&D tax concessions in only raising R&D intensity is mixed, without 
even considering the impact on productivity. In a study of nine OECD countries over a nineteen-year period, 
Bloom et al. (2000) found that tax incentives are effective in increasing R&D intensity. Yet, in a study of Australia 
using financial data on 500 large Australian firms between 1990 and 2005, Thomson (2009) finds that tax 
incentives are not an important determinant of a firm’s R&D investment decisions. 
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FIGURE 11. MARKET-SECTOR MFP GROWTH AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH AGENCIES, 
HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR (1993/94-2012/13) 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
Investments in research and innovation (such as information technology, R&D, 
skills development, design and organisational improvements and other types of 
intangible assets) are regarded as central drivers of productivity. They create more 
efficient services and production processes, more effective workplace organisation, 
and open up new markets. However, it is commonly argued that there are major 
market failures in the provision of a sufficient amount of such knowledge capital, 
as knowledge diffuses beyond the control of the innovator. This implies that the 
private rate of return for research and innovation is lower than its social return, 
resulting in underinvestment in knowledge capital than would be optimal if all 
returns were privately captured. Additionally, the high risks involved discourage 
firms from engaging in such activities.  
For both reasons, the amounts invested by firms in research activities in a 
competitive framework are likely to be below the socially optimal level. This 
justifies intervention by governments directly to make their own investments in 
knowledge capital, or indirectly to support the private sector to reduce its costs. 
However, governments face the stumbling block of a large number of projects 
competing for tight budgets, raising questions about how available funds can be 
distributed most effectively to achieve policy goals, such as raising private-sector 
productivity. This paper makes reference to the international literature and draws 
on recent empirical research for Australia to provide some policy-relevant insights 
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related to the role of government in supporting productivity-enhancing research 
and innovation.  
For a better understanding and to improve the functioning of the innovation 
systems of an economy, it is essential to track, or benchmark, performance. 
Developing robust and relevant measures of research and innovation is difficult. 
The intangible nature of research and innovation poses problems for the 
measurement of spending and the depreciation of spending in defining capital 
stocks. As such, research and innovation are largely ignored in the National 
Accounts and in the corporate financial reports of many countries, where they have 
been only treated as intermediate expenditures. However, excluding investments in 
these intangible assets means that investments are underestimated, which may 
distort measures of growth in capital services and, consequently, productivity. 
Hence, in addressing the role of government funding of research and innovation, 
this paper has paid significant attention to the fundamental issue of accounting for 
investments in knowledge capital.  
Some key findings can be summarised as follows. First, in the case of Australia, 
measuring research and innovation by focusing only on the set of assets currently 
capitalised in the System of National Accounts seems unreliable. Total investment 
has been found to be under-reported, and this has distorted measures of the growth 
of capital services and, consequently, productivity. Different countries have 
capitalised intangibles to different degrees, making international comparisons 
complicated.  
Also in the case of Australia, it was found that the partial capitalisation of 
intangible assets has lowered the estimates of productivity growth. As the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics is a leading agency in improving its National 
Accounts and productivity measurements in this way, it is likely that Australia’s 
relative market-sector performance is better than currently thought.  
Second, the accumulation of private-sector knowledge capital is a source of 
positive benefits (spillover) to market-sector productivity. This implies that 
innovative activity has broad benefits that diffuse through the economy. 
Third, given the pressures on public finances, it is appealing to direct the 
innovation budget to areas with higher social benefits. Consistent with the findings 
of Haskel and Wallis (2010, 2013) for the U.K., the results presented in Section 6 
and further findings of Elnasri and Fox (2014) for Australia suggest that 
government research agencies and higher education are areas with more potential 
gains compared to, e.g., providing firms with tax incentives for investment in R&D. 
This remains a fertile field for further research. For example, the standard 
current approach to the capitalisation of intangibles is that of Corrado, Hulten and 
Sichel (2005, 2006), which effectively treats intangibles as it treats tangibles. That 
is, it treats intangible capital (such as knowledge capital) as if it has similar 
characteristics to a truck, with a finite life during which it depreciates. This 
approach has benefits in terms of familiarity and, with some brave assumptions 
about deflators and depreciation rates, the relative ease of implementation. 
Unfortunately, it is not a very accurate description of what is going on with 
investments in intangibles; it is unlikely that, in general, an idea depreciates in the 
same way as a truck. By developing and expanding the approach proposed by 
Diewert and Fox (2014) in the context of amortizing goodwill (an intangible) for 
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commercial property, and taking into account the “sunk cost” aspect of investments, 
it seems possible to develop a significantly more realistic framework with which to 
address this important problem of appropriately accounting for intangibles. 
An additional unresolved issue is the potential difference in the productivity 
impact from government support for different types of R&D, such as pure basic 
research versus applied research (see Figure 10). The unavailability of sufficient 
survey data prevented the further exploration of this important aspect of investment 
in knowledge capital for Australia.19  
Finally, it is noted that the apparent persistence of the slowdown in productivity 
growth in industrialized countries, combined with recent budget concerns arising 
from less favourable economic conditions, will likely heighten the debate on the 
role of government innovation policies which raise productivity growth.  While 
acknowledging the caveats in the existing literature (including the current paper) 
and the desirability of further analysis if appropriate data becomes available, there 
appears to be a role for government funding support; the evidence suggests that it is 
not through direct industry support through tax incentives but rather through 
support for government research agencies and higher education. 
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